Introduction
We live in perilous times. We live in times where a dirty b o m b going o in lower Manhattan is not unimaginable. We live in times where the CIA interrogations of al Qaeda leaders were so harsh that the FBI would not let its agent participate 36 . We live in times when security and liberty are both endangered.
We also live in times of unimaginable technical creativity. It is faster to use Instant Messaging to query a colleague halfway across the world than it is to walk down the hallway and ask the question, when Google can search four billion web pages faster than the time it takes to pull the right v olume of the Oxford English Dictionary o the library shelf. We live surrounded by a plethora of communicating and computing devices | telephones, PDAs, cell phones, laptops, PCs, computers | and this is only the beginning of the communications revolution.
September 11th presaged a radical change in terrorist intent, a radical change that few had anticipated. The U.S. government responded to September 11th in a number of ways, including the passage of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, which qualitatively extended the government's electronic-surveillance capabilities. The Patriot Act engendered strong debate though not in Congress, where the law passed handily. The most controversial issue regarding the changes in electronicsurveillance law w as that the requirement that foreign intelligence be a primary" reason for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA wiretap was modi ed to foreign intelligence need only be a signi cant" reason for a FISA tap.
Absent from the debates on the Patriot Act was an acknowledgement o f the radical changes that had occurred in communications technologies since the passage of the rst Federal wiretap statute in 1968. Communications technology has changed in numerous ways over the past forty y ears | there is now wide availability of mobile communications, a vast increase in connectivity, and packet-switched systems are being employed for telephony | but there has been no commensurate review of electronic-surveillance laws. We are in a peculiar state: we communicate using mobiles phones and laptops, but the laws governing electronic surveillance were developed at a time of xed-location circuit-based switching systems. Instead of a full-scale reevaluation of surveillance laws, over the last two decades we h a ve pursued a path of minor tweaks to the electronicsurveillance laws. The result is an electronic-surveillance regime that may b e w ell out of sync with the times. This has serious implicationsfor security, liberty, technology, and innovation. In this paper, we examine electronic-surveillance laws in light of current threats and new technologies. We begin by examining the climate in which wiretap laws came to be enacted. 2 The Political Climate at the Time of the Wiretap Act
The sixties were a time of turmoil in the United States, a time of political protest, and civil unrest. In 1963, President John Kennedy was assassinated in a motorcade in Dallas, Texas. In 1965 Malcolm X was killed as he delivered a speech in an auditorium in Harlem. In April 1968, Martin Luther King was killed, and two months later, Robert Kennedy, who was running for President, was shot moments after he learned he had won the California primary. There had been civil rights marches in Washington in the early 1960s, and anti-Vietnam protests in the latter half of the decade. In the summer of 1964, downtown Newark burned; in 1965, the Watts section of Los Angeles; in 1967, downtown Detroit.
It was against this backdrop that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice presented its report. Organized crime had been a problem in the United States since Prohibition, but, because FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ignored it, so did the Federal government. Several events in the late 1950s and early 1960s changed that.
The rst was the discovery, o n N o vember 15, 1957 , by a New York state trooper, of a meeting of organized crime bosses. The trooper was doing routine morning rounds when he discovered far too many black limousines for the tiny upstate town of Apalachin. The trooper set up a roadblock; the crime bosses ed, and the next day, the nation awoke to headlines like`Royal Clambake for Underworld Cooled by P olice,' and`Police Ponder NY Mob Meeting; All Claim They Were Visiting Sick F riend' 13, pp. 168-9 . Meanwhile, while counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Robert Kennedy had uncovered ties between the unions and organized crime. When he became attorney general, Kennedy made organized crime a priority 29 . And nally, an organized crime turncoat, Joseph Valachi, broke the code of silence by testifying to a Senate investigating committee in 1963.
This con uence of events made pursuing organized crime a law-enforcement priority in the late 1960s. The complications of investigating organized crime | the reluctance of victims to testify, so-called victimless crimes e.g., prostitution, and the corruption of local law enforcement made electronic surveillance a particularly valuable tool. The Commission concluded, A majority of the members of the Commission believe that legislation should be enacted granting carefully circumscribed authority for electronic surveillance to law enforcement o cers: : : " 33, p. 203 .
But, as noted in 13, p. 170 ,: Not all experts agreed with the commission's conclusions. Attorney General Clark prohibited all use of wiretaps by federal law-enforcement ofcers. He told Congress:`I know o f n o F ederal conviction based upon any wiretapping or electronic surveillance, and there have been a lot of big ones. : : :I also think that we make cases e ectively without wiretapping or electronic surveillance. I think it may w ell be that with the commitment of the same manpower to other techniques, even more convictions could be secured, because in terms of manpower, wiretapping, and electronic surveillance is very expensive." 8, p. 320 Clark pointed out that in 1967, without using wiretaps, federal strike forces had obtained indictments against organized-crime gures in nine states, and that each strike force has obtained more indictments in its target city than all federal indictments in the nation against organized crime in as recent a y ear as 1960" 8, pp. 79-80 President Johnson publicly supported Clark's opposition to wiretapping, and the President proposed limiting wiretapping to national-security cases 9, p. 222 . But political turmoil and the Crime Commission's report led Congress in a di erent direction, and in 1968 it passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 18 USC x2510 2521, Title III of which legalized law-enforcement wiretaps in criminal investigations. Because of the very invasive nature of the search, wiretaps were limited to a list of twenty-six crimes speci ed in the act, including murder, kidnapping, extortion, gambling, counterfeiting, and sale of marijuana. The Judiciary Committee's report explained that each o ense was chosen because it was intrinsically serious or because it is characteristic of the operations of organized crime," 44, p. 97 .
President Johnson was ambivalent about wiretaps. He had used them | on Martin Luther King during the Democratic convention in 1964 and on Vice President Humphrey in 1968 | but the President described the Title III provisions for wiretapping as undesirable 9, p. 1842 . Nonetheless Johnson signed the bill. Because of the invasive nature of electronic surveillance, Congress decided that there should be stringent o versight, and that review of a federal wiretap warrant application must be done by a federal district court judge.
The judge must determine that i there is probable cause to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an indictable o ense; ii there is probable cause to believe that communications about the o ense will be obtained through the interception; iii normal investigative procedures have been tried and either have failed, appear unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous; and iv there is probable cause to believe that the facilities subject to surveillance are being used or will be used in the commission of the crime x2518 3a-d.
Title III covers procedures for obtaining wiretaps for law-enforcement i n vestigation. In 1972, in a court case involving domestic national-security issues," the Supreme Court ordered an end to warrantless wiretapping, even for nationalsecurity purposes. Because of Watergate, and the discovery of numerous so-called national-security wiretaps that were actually wiretaps for political purposes 42 , it took until 1978 before Congress was actually able to frame and pass legislation authorizing procedures for obtaining wiretaps for national-security i n vestigations: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The judge, a member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court of eleven judges appointed from seven of the United States judicial circuits x1803 a, must determine i that there is probable cause that the target is a foreign or target of a foreign power, ii that there is probable cause that the targeted communications device is being used by the foreign power or its agent, that iii that a primary purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, and that iv such information cannot reasonably by obtained by other investigative techniques. 1 Title III and FISA form the basis for U.S. wiretap law. There are also state statutes approximately half of all criminal wiretaps in the United States are done under state wiretap warrants. The rules governing state wiretaps must be at least as restrictive as those governing Title III.
There have been several updates and modi cations to the federal wiretap statutes, which will be discussed after examining the changes in communications technology over the last four decades.
Current Threats
In the U.S. we are currently seeing a strident debate on surveillance technologies, most especially datamining.This paper is not the place for a full discussion of the methods and means used in terrorist investigations. In the context of reexamining electronic-surveillance laws, however, it is useful to make some observations about terrorism and terrorist investigations.
By any measure, terrorism is a very di cult o ense to investigate or prevent. In many cases, the rst crime committed is the only crime. There is no trail. The investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, described CIA e orts in southern Lebanon during the 1980s, : : : when the C.I.A. started to go after the Islamic Jihad, a radical Lebanese group linked to a series of kidnappings in the Reagan years,`its people systematically went through documents all over Beirut, even destroying student records.'
One of the hallmarks of modern terrorist groups is the shifting and di use organizational structure 39, p. 271 . On the one hand, this means that eliminating the leadership does not necessarily eliminate the problem. On the other, di use and ever-changing structures create weaknesses within the organization. One that can be exploited is the terrorists' need for communication.
In this situation, tra c analysis often proves more useful than wiretapping. Wiretaps can be confused by encryption, even encryption of a very simple sort. Seymour Hersh reported that, 1 The law provides that N o United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the rst amendment to the Constitution of the United States" x1805a3A.
The terrorists coped with the American ability t o i n tercept conversations worldwide by constantly changing codes | often doing little more than changing the meanings of commonly used phrases. The problem is being unable to decode the language is not new. It can even occur without deliberate intent b y the criminal or terrorist group. The National Research Council report, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society described an FBI wiretap of police o cers who were allegedly guarding a drug shipment. The FBI agents overhead a conversation in which the o cers discussed murdering an individual who had led a police brutality complaint. The bureau was unable to decode a participant's street slang," and was thus unable to prevent the murder 10, p. 88 .
The inability to understand surveilled conversations does not mean that the surveillance is useless. In particular, tra c analysis has become an extremely valuable aspect of surveillance, and one cannot confuse tra c-analysis e orts in quite the same way as one confuses content analysis. One example of the value of tra c analysis is that Osama Bin Laden stopped using a cell phone in late 2001 because of the tracking capabilities of U.S. intelligence.
Even anonymous" cellphones can be used for tracking. In a case in 2002, investigators tracked al Qaeda members through terrorists use of prepaid Swisscom phonecards. These had been purchased in bulk | anonymously. But when investigators discovered through a wiretap on an intercepted call that lasted less than a minute and involved not a single word of conversation" that they were on to an al Qaeda group, the agents tracked the users of the bulk purchase 45 . The result was the arrest of a number of operatives and the break-up of al Qaeda cells. You can run, but you can't hide. Anonymity is not all that it is cracked up to be.
One important aspect of terrorist investigations is to follow the money." Many terrorist groups hide behind legitimate charitable groups, but these are groups with money trails 39, p. 274 . We should note, however, that following the money" is not a straightforward issue in terms of civil liberties. The Patriot Act section dealing with money laundering and terrorist nancing is controversial admidst claims that its provisions have been applied to charitable groups with no ties to terrorist activities. Money trails can be complicated to follow, and the terrorists do a good job of hiding trails by passing money through many intermediaries, but the fact is that there is a trail. Once there is trail, it can be investigated.
The current terrorist threat is very di erent from earlier terrorist movements. A di erent from earlier terrorism threats, such as the Russian nihilists of the nineteenth century or the Palestinian terrorists of the 1970s, is the huge reservoir of potential recruits. Globalization complicates the problem. Indeed, one legitimately argue that globalization is a large part of the problem | but that is a topic for a di erent paper. In the late 1990s, Senators Hart and Rudman chaired a national security commission study to examine emerging threats. In a prescient observation, the Hart-Rudman report in early 2001 warned of the likelihood of catastropic domestic attacks caused by i n ternational terrorism. The report observed, All borders will become more porous." 41, p. 2 This has already happened in Europe. While the borders have become porous, apparently cooperation between di erent nations' law enforcement has not yet followed suit.
Terrorism is not a passing phenomenon. It will be with us for a long time. It is important that we respond to the threat in a way that simultaneously protects our security and our liberty.
Changing Communications Technology
The rst hundred of years the telephone saw c hange: from local systems entirely mediated by operators to global networks entirely run by electronic switching systems. There was innovation: mobile phone, rst deployed n 1946 6, 215 , faxes, and modems. There was development of infrastructure: optical bers and communication satellites, as well the digitization of the backbone network.
Yet slightly more than a generation ago, the telephone remained a xed device: a black machine with a rotary dial that transmitted voice also data; from the beginning, the telephone was also a data-transmission network data, e.g., telegraph. In the sixties innovation was the introduction of the Princess" phone in colors!: white, beige, pink, blue, or turquoise and Touchtone service buttons instead of rotary dials, while industry got Centrex, an automatic switching exchange for large o ces, and data-phones" modems 6, p. 266 . What occurred in the rst century was growth: ten million phone users in 1900, one hundred million in 1960, ve h undred million in 1990 2 .
The innovation of the rst hundred years of the telephone pales in contrast to the growth and changes of the last decade and a half. There were 1.4 billion users in 2000, 400 million of those cell phone users. There probably has been as much innovation in telephony in the last quarter century as there had been in the previous one hundred years.
Recent telecommunications growth has been spurred by three technical developments: mobile technology, greater bandwidth, and the Internet. AT&T has had car phones since 1946 6, p. 215 , but such service was rare and expensive until the early 1990s. Mobile technology took o with the 1983 development o f cell" technology. In under a decade, cell phones have become ubiquitous, as has the wireless Internet. Once the Web appeared, the race to install broadband was on. In 1999, less than 10 of U.S. households had broadband; by early 2004, the percentage was 45 32 . The shift to Internet communications is the most fundamental of the changes. The Internet enabled email, which is the killer app of the Internet 34 , Instant Messaging, and the nascent technology: VoIP voice over IP. This is only the beginning of the communications revolution. We are moving from a circuit-based system based on transmitting voice to a high-speed, packetswitched network transmitting data. The pervasiveness of our communication systems will shift all that we do. These social and technological changes should be taken into account the discussion of electronic-surveillance laws. ECPA updated Title III and FISA to apply to electronic communications," de ned as communications carried by wire or radio and not involving the human voice. ECPA w as less strict about the type of crimes for which there could be interception: any federal felony m a y b e i n vestigated using interception of electronic communications. ECPA also modi ed the rules for electronic communications. In contrast to Title III and FISA, which required naming the device and person to be tapped, ECPA allowed for roving wiretaps" | wiretaps with unspeci ed locations | if there was demonstration of probable cause that the subject was attempting to evade surveillance by switching telephones. In recognition of the greater ease in obtaining signalling information, ECPA provided for tra c analysis. Under ECPA, a subpoena is needed for all pen registers, which record all numbers dialed from a phone, and all trap-and-trace devices, which record all numbers dialed to a phone. Furthermore, under ECPA, law enforcement only needs a search w arrant, rather than the more stringent wiretap warrant, to access stored communications voice mail or email that has been read and then stored.
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CALEA in 1994 was very controversial. In 1992 the FBI pressed for a Digital Telephony" bill, which required that all telephone-switching equipment be designed to accommodate wiretapping. Civil-liberties groups and the telecommunications industry opposed the bill, and there were no sponsors of it.
The FBI returned to Congress in 1994 with a modi ed version, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act," which included a $500 million authorization but not appropriation to the telecommunications companies for modi cations to old equipment this caused the telecommunications companies to drop their opposition. The bill required that any equipment deployed after January 1, 1995 would have to meet law-enforcement i n terception standard; the Department of Justice would determine which w ould be the standards-setting organization. This bill passed in the waning days of 1994 after certain civil-liberties groups dropped their opposition.
From the start, implementation of CALEA went badly. The Department o f Justice put the FBI, an agency not known for expertise in telecommunications, in charge of setting the implementation standards. In October 1995 the FBI announced its requirements, which w ould have e n tailed capacity t o s i m ultaneously monitor thirty thousand lines 19 20 13, p. 197 , a striking number at a time when the total numb e r o f a n n ual Title III and FISA surveillances, including pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, was a quarter of that. In 1995 the average Title III wiretap ran for 29 days 1, p. 13 . There is no public information about the length of FISA taps. There were strong objections to the methodology the FBI used to arrive at this gure and the bureau decided to reexamine the capacity issue. Their new methodology required capacity t o r u n sixty-thousand surveillances simultaneously 3 20 13, p. 198 
There was also a ght about location information for cellular calls. During hearings on CALEA, FBI Director Freeh had promised that the bill would not expand wiretapping powers 24, p. 29 , and the legislative report stated that call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber" CALEA x103 a2B. Nonetheless the FBI proposed that the cellular telecommunications group adopt a standard that would enable law enforcement to quickly establish the location of a wireless user 30 . In CALEA, Congress de ned information services," distinguishing it from telecommunications services." Information services were de ned as A mean ing the o ering of a capability generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications; and B includes i a service that permits a customer to retrieve stored information from, or le information for storage in, information storage facilities; ii electronic publishing; and iii electronic messaging services; but C does not include any capability for a telecommunications carrier's internal management, control, or operation of its telecommunications network" CALEA x102 6. The bill explicitly states that the interception requirements do not apply to information services CALEA x103 b2A.
Over time, the list of crimes for which Title III is applicable grew substantially. I t n o w lists 98 o enses, including computer fraud and abuse 18 U.S.C. x2516. Even though the vast majority of wiretapping investigations concentrate on drug tra cking and organized crime 2, T able 3 , the law is not so tightly focused as had been at its inception.
How Exposed is Personal Information?
Changes in technology as well as social norms means that individuals leave tracks wherever they go in modern society. A generation ago, individuals scrawled their names on a card inside the book they borrowed from a library; now book borrowing records library are entered into a central database. A generation ago, individuals received a hotel key; now the key" is a plastic card that includes a strip that may o r m a y not have the lodger's name and credit-card information on it. A generation ago, an individual gave a name for a plane ticket, and then may h a ve sold the ticket to a friend; now the name on government-issued IDs must match name on the the ticket. As Je rey Rosen has observed, we are the naked crowd" 37 .
One signi cant c hange over the last several decades is the major loss of anonymity that has resulted from credit cards becoming the payment method of choice. The nancial dossiers created enable tracking and identi cation of individuals in a way that plunking three hundred dollars down for a used car does not. Because credit cards have essentially become required for travel at least for car rental and hotel reservations, credit-card records provide excellent after-the-fact records of where individuals have been, when and, in some cases, with whom. Evidence of this is in the tracking of the September 11th hijackers. By September 14, 2001, law enforcement had put together a impressive dossier on the hijackers: where and how they had purchased their tickets, where they were living before the attacks, and where they had gone to and ight s c hool not all of them had 23 . It was in the ubiquitous trail that individuals leave as part of modern life.
We leave video tracks not just at the airport and the ATM, but at totally unexpected stops. Timothy McVeigh had no intention of leaving a trail when he rented a truck in Junction City Kansas but, as noted in 13 5 . Imminent c hanges in technology will create even more detailed trails. Sensors, low-cost wireless devices, will monitor the environment and report back: The elderly patient has a blood pressure of 110 70," The room is at 75 degrees." RFID Radio Frequency ID devices will report about items an individual carries on his person: clothes, currency, a book. The sensor and RFID communications will often occur without the individual's knowledge 4 .
It is not clear how an expiring milk carton informing the supermarket that it is time for a new dairy order will bene t tracking of terrorists and criminals. But one wouldn't necessarily have a n ticipated that an intercepted phone call in which n o w ords were spoken and that was paid for via an anonymously-purchased prepaid card would have led to a major breakthrough in a terrorist investigation either. The fact that data storage is dropping in price encourages the storage of transactional information, information that will be accessible to investigators.
It is not currently the case that an individual's data is arbitrarily subject to law enforcement perusal. The question of under what circumstances government can do data mining is currently a subject of much debate and some studies e.g., 40 . In thinking about federal wiretap statutes, it is important to put the issue in context, and in particular to be cognizant that there is much more data easily accessible on individuals than there was at the time of the passage of the Wiretap Act. Under appropriate circumstances, that data is available to law-enforcement and national-security o cials.
What is the E ect of Communications Surveillance on Liberty?
We h a ve brie y examined the changes in communications technology and in the accessibility of individual's private data at the dawn of the twenty-rst century. We need to begin at the beginning, the time of the founding of the United States. As Whit eld Di e has remarked, P rior to the electronic era conversing in complete privacy required neither special equipment nor advanced planning. Walking a short distance away from other people and looking around to be sure that no one was hiding nearby w as su cient. Before tape recorders, parabolic microphones, and laser interferometers, it was not possible to intercept a conversation held out of sight and earshot of other people. No matter how m uch George III might h a ve w anted to learn the contents of Hancock's private conversations with Adams, he had no hope of doing so unless he could induce one or the other to defect to the Crown 13, p. 2 .
In the United States, the founders reacted to the broad searches by British solders under general writs of assistance by restricting government p o wer through the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and e ects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or a rmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. No warrants shall issue but upon probable cause : : : and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This would be signi cant when it came time to apply the Fourth Amendment to communications surveillance. Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in his famous dissent i n the Olmstead case, The evil incident t o i n vasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, con dential, and privileged, may b e o verheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping 4, pp. 475-6 .
Experiences with government surveillance, extensively described elsewhere see e.g., 13, pp. 137-150, 172-179, 271-2 , 42 , demonstrated serious dangers to political discourse and public expression. During the period from the 1940s to the 1970s, for example, Supreme Court justices, White House sta ers, members of the National Security Council, Congressional sta ers, civil-rights leaders, including Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy Jr, anti-Vietnam War protesters, and journalists were wiretapped. These breaches made Congress wary of providing law-enforcement and national-security i n vestigators with such a potentially invasive tool. This is why the requirements for a wiretap warrant are signi cantly more stringent than those for a normal" search w arrant 5 .
Wiretaps intrude on a conversation between two people and thus require the high level of wiretap search w arrant before tapping can commence. But there is no similar level of protection for transactional information on what number is being called and what number is calling. The legal rationale is that such transactional information is already being shared with a third party in this case, the telephone switch and the communicating parties do not have a n y expectation of privacy on the data. Thus a subpoena, which can be obtained from a magistrate, su ces for pen registers and trap-and-trace devices 6 . 5 It is also why public reporting of Title III wiretaps is required; each y ear, the Administrative O ce of the U.S. Courts produces a report listing each Title III wiretap of the previous year ongoing taps are not reported until they have ceased to be used, including the D.A., the judge issuing the wiretap search w arrant, the length of order, the most" serious crime for which the wiretap was ordered there may be more than one for a single wiretap, the number of incriminating and non-incriminating calls picked up on the wiretap, the cost of the surveillance, etc. Except for annually reporting to Congress the number of surveillances, there are no public disclosure requirements for FISA wiretaps. 6 This paper concentrates on the technology side of the electronic-surveillance issues, not the policy. Nonetheless, we w ould be remiss if we did not point out that tra c analysis, though usually less intrusive than content surveillance, may nonetheless cause severe privacy breaches. One such example occurred in the 1980s FBI investigation of CISPES, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, an American group which supported the opposition to the El Salvadorian government. On the basis of an informer's information, the FBI started an investigation of CIS-PES, eventually culminating in les on more than twenty-three hundred individuals. Much of the information was obtained through phone records. The investigation was not justi ed; the group was not a terrorist organization, and in 1988, FBI Director William Sessions told Congress that, T here was no reason : : : to expand the investigation so widely" 38, p. 122 .
In this paper we are focusing our discussion on technology implications of wiretapping rather than policy issues. Nonetheless, as we consider the role of surveillance in current communications technology, w e m ust never lose sight o f Brandeis's words, As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping 4, pp. 476 ."
Telephony and the Internet: Two Di erent Architectures
The Public Switched Telephone Network PSTN was built to maximize the quality o f v oice transmissions and everything in the network was designed to that end. The Internet was designed for reliability, a v ery di erent quality. The PSTN uses circuit switching to transmit information from sender to receiver, the Internet, packet switching. The PSTN and the Internet have fundamentally di erent architectures. This simple fact means that many of the surveillance tasks do not directly translate from one domain to the other.
Electronic Surveillance on the Internet
Consider, for example, the e ect of packet-based technology on the transmittal of transactional information. In telephony, signaling information appears at the beginning of the call and is separated from call contents. In packet-switched systems such as the Internet, because data is broken into packets," each one of which has the addressing information, contents do not have the same physical separation from the signalling" information probably more properly called transactional information in this case.
Furthermore, electronic communications typically present more personallyidenti able information present in the so-called transactional information. At a minimum,this may simply include place of business, e.g., susan.landau@sun.com. But it may include much more, e.g., if the transactional information is the result of a google search, the URL will reveal the search terms 7 .
An even more crucial di erent b e t ween the PSTN and the Internet is that in the Internet, the intelligence is at the endpoints. The underlying network system is simple, while the endpoints can deploy complex systems. This fundamental architectural idea is what makes the Internet so versatile. Applications can be designed far beyond what the original designers of the Internet had in mind. And indeed, innovation has ourished because the endpoints competed and created new services. No one needs to depend on the infrastructure company to do the innovation for them.
The design exibility comes at a price that we do not often think of as a price: the Internet is hard to control. This does not mean political or border controls though those are also often di cult to implement on the Internet but design control. This is not a bug; it is an extremely attractive feature. In a sharp, and deliberate, distinction from the telephony network, the Internet was designed to be loosely controlled. The layered approach to network design provides that e ect and is what has enabled much o f I n ternet innovation.
For those that choose to invest the e ort, Internet communications can be fully protected. The Internet design of intelligence at the endpoints complicates wiretapping, which is useless if end systems adequately protect their communications although a wiretapped encrypted conversation will still provide trafc information. In recent y ears, protecting the privacy of communications has become an important security goal. Indeed, the U.S. government has moved in the direction of simplifying the deployment of communications security i n commercial equipment, partially as a result of the government's move to purchasing COTS commercial o the shelf equipment rather than the purchase of custom-designed systems. Instead of restricting the use of cryptography, the U.S. government has recently encouraged a number of security e orts, including the development of the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard and the deployment of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. Attempts to build wiretapping capabilities into Internet protocols would seem to go against these e orts.
At the same time, as an IETF Network Working Group studying the issue of architecting wiretap requirements into Internet protocols observed, the use of existing network features, if deployed intelligently, provide extensive opportunities for wireteapping" 35 .
The Risks Wiretapping P oses to Internet Security
Under CALEA, telecommunications systems deployed after January 1, 1995 must be built wiretap accessible. Suppose one were to call for that same requirement on the Internet. Does such an obligation make sense? Can it be architected in? What does it do to security requirements?
Wiretapping is an architected security breach. Saying that Internet communication protocols necessarily must have wiretapping requirements built in is to say that security loopholes must be built into communication protocols. It means that privacy of the communication must be deliberately violated and in a way that does not alert the sender or recipient.
Of course, U.S. law-enforcement and national-security agents are not the only ones interested in wiretapping the Internet; foreign governments are as well. Any technology that is designed to simplify Internet wiretapping by U.S. intelligence may w ell be exploited by foreign-intelligence services. During the discussions on CALEA, there were concerns about the security problems created by building in" wiretapping capablities for digital telephony 15 . Such fears pale when measured against designing such capabilities for the Internet. Internet wiretapping technology, found and reverse engineered by foreign-intelligence services, could enable massive surveillance of U.S. persons" citizens and corporations. Used in combination with inexpensive automated search technology, this could lead to serious security breaches.
There is risk to the U.S. economy the potential loss of corporate information. There is risk to U.S. national security through the provision of coste ective massive i n telligence gathering. There is risk to the freedom of U.S. citizens. These are the risks 7 that the European governments responded to when, in 1999, they decided to liberalize their cryptographic export-control policy. As did the United States when it liberalized its cryptographic export-control policies shortly afterwards 14 .
If we w ere to build access for U.S. law enforcement or national security i n to Internet communications,such protocol design would have be done very carefully. Can it be? It is highly doubtful. As the IETF Network Working Group observed, any protocol designed with wiretapping capabilities built in is inherently less secure than it would be without the wiretapping capability. Building wiretapping requirements into network protocols makes the protocols more complex. As is well known, complex protocols are prone to security a ws. The secure Internet is a c hallenge. Despite best e orts, security breaches slip into many protocols. No one wants to see deliberately-architected security breaches. In 2000 the IETF Network Working Group decided not to consider requirements for wiretapping as part of the IETF standards process 35 . 7 What is the Right T radeo for Communications Surveillance?
What are the costs to communications technology of continuing to enable wiretaps? A recent FBI petition to the FCC gives an illustration. The bureau argued that CALEA's purpose is to help lawful electronic surveillance keep pace with changes in telecommunications technology as telecommunications services migrate to new technologies" 21, pp. 3-4 and stated that thus CALEA is applicable not only to entities and services that employ circuit-mode technology, but also to entities and services that employ packet-mode technology" 21, p. 6 . The Bureau urged the FCC to declare that any service providing voice communications, including Voice over IP VoIP, should be viewed as a telecommunications carrier."
The breadth of this claim is startling. Were the FCC to grant the petition unknown at the time of this writing, this would put the FBI squarely in the middle of designing IETF protocols. What would the technological cost of granting this petition be? One can scarcely imagine. At a minimum, granting the petition would drive up costs, impair and delay innovation, threaten privacy, and force development of the latest Internet innovations o shore" according to a response led by a coalition of industry and civil-liberties groups 26 . As we have observed earlier, it would also threaten security.
Does the value of wiretapping justify trying to preserve the tool? This, of course, depends on whom you ask. As the FBI was pressing the Digital Telephony bill in the early 1990s, the bureau argued that wiretapping was a critical tool in the ght against organized crime. The FBI presented claims that court-ordered wiretaps resulted in over seven thousand convictions, three hundred million dollars in nes levied, and over three-quarters of a billion dollars in recoveries, restitutions, and court-ordered forfeitures over a six-year period 18 . But White House sta ers 3 , the Treasury Department 28 , and the Vice-President's o ce 31 all disputed the FBI numbers.
There is no question that wiretapping can be e ective in some cases. Its most important v alue may be as a deterrent: knowing that law enforcement is listening in, criminals and terrorists stay o the line. Or they speak in code: The big guy is coming. He will be here soon." 45 Making the use of electronic communications di cult for criminals and terrorists denies them one of the greatest technological advances of the last century.
As we h a ve seen, greater surveillance value may come from tra c analysis, which has already shown remarkable bene ts in the ght against terrorism. Given the U.S. government's shift on cryptographic export controls, one might reasonably argue that intelligence agencies have come to the same conclusion.
The debate about electronic surveillance must not occur in isolation. U.S. wiretapping laws were passed when the opportunity to easily obtain massive, automatically-created, data trails did not exist. Video cameras in McDonalds, at ATM machines, E-Z pass automatically recording the trip through the toll booths, sensors and RFID tags are all aspects of this changing technology. One has just to look at disappearance of pay phones 8 to realize how m uch the way w e communicate, both in frequency and in mode, has substantially changed from only a generation ago.
If Congress were not to preserve l a w-enforcement's capability to wiretap, what investigative tools might be o ered in trade? A clear one is easy access to communications transactional information. One of the non-controversial aspects of the Patriot Act is that it simpli ed the procedure for obtaining pen register and trap-and-trace orders, no longer requiring an application in each jurisdiction, but letting a single application su ce. Tra c analysis has become signi cantly easier to obtain and it may be appropriate to trade further capabilities in this direction. For example, the decreasing costs of storage have made record saving much less onerous. Might it be appropriate to require service providers to keep records of communications which n umbers, when, for how long for a speci ed period in exchange for deciding that communicationssystems will not be required to be built wiretap accessible?
The threat of terrorism will confront our society for a long time. But we should not necessarily be extending a 1960s wiretap law i n to the twenty-rst century. Instead we should be examining rst principles to determine what surveillance laws are appropriate for current c hallenges. Wiretapping became a l a w-enforcement tool in the late 1920s; its use was codi ed in the 1960s and 1970s. If attempting to preserve the tool in order to enable investigators to hold onto this capability w ould freeze communications in an antiquated technology, that may be the wrong route for our society to take. It may be that few security bene ts accrue from the requirement that electronic communications be designed wiretap accessible" while e orts to do so signi cantly impede innovation. It is time to fully examine electronic surveillance: it value, needs, and costs. Such a discussion is a necessity in our complicated times. It is crucial as we attempt to solve the current threats to security and liberty.
